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Abstract: We examine the effect of a permanent change to a country
corporate income repatriation tax system on corporate financial policies. In
2009, Japan and the United Kingdom switched from a worldwide system to a
territorial system for the taxation of repatriated foreign earnings, effectively
reducing the tax liabilities of most multinational firms when repatriating
earnings. We find that after the change firms accumulate less cash, pay out
larger amounts through dividends and share repurchases, and invest less
abroad. We do not find that the tax system change has significantly affected
domestic investments even when controlling for capital constraints.

The system under which countries levy taxes on foreign profits
repatriated to the domestic headquarters of multinational corporations
recently has been the subject of a heated debate among policy makers
and corporate lobbyists, due in part to its significant implications on
the level of tax receipts.1 Recent studies on a temporary change in the
Review of Financial Studies, Vol 28, No. 8 (August 2015): pg. 2250-2280. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Oxford University Press.

1

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

earnings repatriation tax in the United States (Dharmapala, Foley, and
Forbes 2011; Faulkender and Petersen 2012) show that these tax
systems also affect corporate financial policies. In this study we
analyze for the first time the implication of a permanent exogenous
change in the taxation system of repatriated earnings on an array of
financial policies. Specifically, we investigate the change from a
worldwide repatriation tax system to a territorial system that took
effect concurrently in the United Kingdom and Japan in 2009. This
permanent change provides a unique opportunity to test the longlasting effects of a territorial tax system reform not only on corporate
policies that are highly flexible, such as cash holdings and share
repurchases, but also on those policies, such as dividend payments
and corporate investments, which require a longer time to adjust to an
exogenous shock.
Of the two systems that regulate the taxation of foreign
earnings repatriated to the domestic headquarters of multinational
firms most countries adopt a territorial system. Under this system, the
parent country levies taxes only on corporate profits earned at home.
Foreign subsidiaries' repatriated profits as intrafirm dividends are
exempt.2 Under the worldwide system, used by the United States and
a minority of other countries, the domestic country can instead levy
corporate taxes on repatriated profits earned abroad. If the foreign
corporate tax rate is smaller than the domestic corporate tax rate, a
firm pays taxes to the foreign country on subsidiary income and then
pays the remaining difference to the parent country upon repatriation
of the profits. If, instead, the foreign tax rate is larger than the
domestic tax rate, a firm pays taxes to the foreign country on
subsidiary income and then receives a foreign tax credit on the
difference by the parent country (Graham 2008) upon repatriation of
the profits.3
The repatriation tax system adopted by a country is likely to
have significant implications on the level of domestic and foreign
corporate investments and corporate payout policy. Under the
worldwide system, corporations can defer taxations on foreign
earnings until the cash is repatriated back to the domestic country. As
long as earnings remain abroad, these companies can effectively avoid
domestic taxation of foreign income in a way similar to that of firms
residing in territorial system countries (Markle 2013). The ability of
Review of Financial Studies, Vol 28, No. 8 (August 2015): pg. 2250-2280. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Oxford University Press.

2

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

firms residing in worldwide systems to indefinitely postpone cash
domestic income taxes on foreign earnings is usually paired by
accounting rules that allow corporations to also avoid financial
accounting income tax expenses (Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 2011).
Therefore, the worldwide system has the net effect of discouraging the
transfer of earnings from a foreign subsidiary to the domestic parent,
especially when the domestic country, as the United States or Japan,
has a high corporate tax rate (Altshuler and Grubert 2002). Foley et al.
(2007) find that U.S. firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold more
cash overall.
Our study exploits the recent permanent change in the
repatriation tax system in the United Kingdom and Japan. Both the
United Kingdom and Japan switched from a worldwide to a territorial
system at the beginning of 2009. In early December 2008, Japan
issued a tax reform package that was implemented the following year.
The package included a 95% foreign dividend tax exemption for
foreign dividends received by Japanese corporations from foreign
subsidiaries. The territorial tax system proposal was intended to
promote repatriation of foreign earnings to Japan and to encourage
Japanese firms to increase domestic investments. To limit further
reduction in corporate tax income, Japan also enacted other transfer
pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules to limit the use of debt
by foreign subsidiaries (Landau et al. 2009).4
The U.K. government released a new rule for the full tax
exemption of repatriated foreign subsidiary earnings on December 9,
2008, which was then implemented in 2009. The main goal of the U.K.
Treasury was to improve Britain's reputation as an attractive business
location and prevent U.K. multinationals to relocate abroad.
Concurrently to the territorial tax system reform, the U.K.
implemented antiavoidance measures and thin capitalization rules
similar to Japan.5 In addition to the long-term effects that we study in
this paper, the territorial tax system reform had the short-term effect
to encourage some of the firms that moved their fiscal headquarters
abroad to move back to the United Kingdom. Two of twenty-two U.K.
firms that moved their headquarters abroad in the few years before
the reform announced that they were considering to move back to the
U.K. after the implementation of the territorial tax system.6
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It is important to notice that during the worldwide system
period accounting rules such as IAS 12 (analogous to U.S. GAAP APB
23) allowed British and Japanese multinational firms to avoid
accounting recording of income tax expense related to foreign earnings
on their consolidated financial statements. Therefore, avoiding the
repatriation of foreign earnings not only permitted avoidance of cash
income taxes but also of financial accounting tax expenses.
This study examines for the first time the corporate financial
policy implications of a permanent change in a country income
repatriation tax system. Previous studies have been confined to the
analysis of U.S. samples focusing on a single tax system and a single
financial policy decision, such as cash holdings or foreign acquisitions
(e.g., Foley et al. 2007; Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi Forthcoming), or a
temporary change in income repatriation taxation, such as the 2004
American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA), also known as the Homeland
Investment Act (Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 2011; Faulkender and
Petersen 2012). Our examination of a permanent change to the
repatriation tax system provides a unique opportunity to analyze how
different is the corporate response to a lasting reform versus a
temporary one for corporate financial policies that are less time
variant, such as dividend payments and corporte investments.
In this study we specifically examine if the change in the
repatriation tax system significantly affects the level of corporate cash
holdings, the amount of dividends paid and shares repurchased by the
parent company, and the amount of domestic and foreign capital
expenditures. We find that Japanese and U.K. multinationals
accumulate less cash overall, invest less abroad, and distribute more
cash to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases after
the adoption of the territorial system in 2009. Our paper is the first to
analyze the impact of a change in repatriation taxes on foreign capital
expenditures and to show that, everything else constant, a shift to a
territorial system reduces foreign investments. Our results, however,
do not show that the change in the repatriation tax system has a
significant effect on the level of domestic corporate investments even
when we control for the firm's availability of capital. Our results on
cash holdings, payout policy, and foreign investments also have strong
economic significance. For a multinational firm with average assets in
our sample, a change in the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage
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coefficient from its 2006–2008 mean value of −0.0030 to zero during
the 2009–2011 territorial system period causes a drop in multinational
firms' cash holdings ranging from $43 to $64 million, an increase in
dividends between $51 and $60 million, an increase in total net
payouts between $64 and $69 million, and a decrease in foreign
capital expenditures between $14 and $18 million depending on the
multivariate specification (firm fixed effects or industry and year fixed
effects), everything else constant. The results of this study show that,
unlike the U.S. temporary tax holiday in 2004 (Dharmapala, Foley, and
Forbes 2011), a permanent change of the repatriation tax system has
a larger impact on dividends than on share repurchases.
The findings of this study are particularly relevant given the
policy debate in the United States about a possible modification of the
worldwide system or a possible switch to a territorial system in the
same guise of Japan and the United Kingdom. While an analysis of the
effect of this change on government tax receipts is outside of the
scope of this paper, our study shows the strong impact that this policy
change is likely to have on corporate financial policies of U.S.
multinational firms.
Even though the shift from a worldwide system to a territorial
system in both the United Kingdom and Japan took place during the
great recession period, a comparison between the change in the
number, operating performance, and domestic investments of
multinational and domestic firms dispels concerns about a possible
causation between specific changes in multinational firms and the
following tax reform. Despite the fact that one of the main goals of the
British reform was to create an incentive for U.K. multinational firms to
maintain their headquarters in Great Britain, the number of publicly
traded U.K. multinational firms actually increased by 20%, whereas
the number of domestic firms declined by 0.4% in the three years
preceding the reform. The trend was similar in Japan, where the
number of multinational firms increased by 7%, whereas the number
of domestic firms increased by only 0.6%. The Japanese government
mentioned the goal of spurring domestic investments as a main
motivation of the tax reform. However, median domestic investments
to total assets actually increased by 5.9% for multinational firms,
while they declined by 4% for domestic firms in the three years before
the reform. Moreover, whereas all firms experienced a decline in
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income before the reform due to the recession, domestic firms
suffered more than multinational firms. The median operating income
to total assets declined by 8% between 2006 and 2008 for domestic
firms but only 3% for multinational firms.7
We control for the potential biasing effect of the recessionary
years in our sample (2008 and 2009) in several ways. The main
multivariate regressions include a year indicator variable and several
firm characteristics that are significantly affected by the business
cycle. In the robustness section we re-estimate our main multivariate
tests, excluding the recessionary years. We also implement an
unreported difference-in-differences estimation in which we compare
the group of multinational firms affected by the tax change with a
control group of firms not affected by the change (purely domestic
firms) before and after the implementation of the territorial system. All
these tests produce results comparable to those presented in the main
multivariate analysis section of the paper. As an additional robustness
test to verify that our results are not influenced by some omitted,
time-varying country factors, we compare the behavior of firms facing
a tax cost with firms benefitting from a tax credit upon repatriating
earnings during the worldwide system period and their reaction to the
territorial reform. We find that tax credit firms increase their cash
holdings and decrease payouts after the reform.
It is important to note that the tax planning implemented by
many multinational firms to limit taxation of foreign profits might,
everything else constant, strengthen the effect of a shift from a
worldwide to a territorial system on corporate financial policies. Firms
can implement “double Irish” and “Dutch sandwiches” arrangements or
transfer pricing schemes to significantly reduce their foreign tax
liabilities. However, these tax planning strategies are mainly intended
to avoid foreign taxation. If those foreign earnings are repatriated to
the domestic headquarters, under the worldwide system they would be
taxed at the domestic tax rate minus any tax paid in the foreign
subsidiaries. Therefore, these foreign tax avoidance schemes have the
net effect of increasing the difference between the effective tax rate
abroad and in the domestic country and providing an even stronger
motivation for a multinational firms to not repatriate foreign earnings
to the domestic headquarters under the worldwide system. These
firms might be likely to implement more radical changes to their
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corporate financial policies after a territorial tax reform compared with
firms that do not aggressively implement foreign tax avoidance
schemes.8
Even though the territorial tax reform is a large exogenous shift
in tax policy, multinational corporations have to abide by other tax
rules that might affect their after-tax earnings. For example, a change
in controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules or changes in tax treaties
might partially offset the effect of a territorial tax reform. Although we
cannot empirically control for changes in CFC rules, we realize that
they might have the effect of biasing our study against finding
significant results.

1. Hypotheses Development
Multinational firms have to consider several possible alternatives
on how to best use the profits generated by their foreign subsidiaries.
Firms can maintain foreign earnings abroad to increase subsidiaries'
cash holdings; they can use foreign earnings to increase investments
in the subsidiary countries; or they can repatriate foreign income to
increase domestic cash holdings, increase corporate payouts, embark
in new domestic capital investments, or initiate acquisitions. Markle
(2013) finds that multinational firms subject to territorial tax systems
repatriate more income to their parent country. Altshuler and Grubert
(2002) argue that firms residing in worldwide tax system countries
with high corporate tax rates and with a majority of foreign
subsidiaries in countries with lower tax rates tend to avoid the high
taxes on repatriation by keeping foreign earnings abroad. Grubert and
Mutti (2001) find that firms with manufacturing subsidiaries with
effective tax rates below 10% repatriate on average only 7% of their
earnings. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) find that a decline of
repatriation tax rates of 1% is associated with an increase of 1% in
intrafirm dividends for U.S. firms. Repatriation taxes can in part
explain why U.S. firms hold more cash than what is predicted by
standard firm characteristics (Foley et al. 2007). As documented by
Foley et al. (2007) for U.S firms, we also expect Japanese and U.K.
firms to hold a large quantity of cash abroad during the worldwide
system to avoid taxes upon earnings repatriation. Because the
territorial system reform effectively eliminates the earnings
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repatriation tax, we expect the firms in our sample to experience a
decline in the level of consolidated cash as they repatriate more cash,
which then can be used for corporate payouts, acquisitions, or
domestic corporate investments. Therefore, we formulate our first
hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation
tax costs during the worldwide tax system period hold less cash overall
after the adoption of the territorial tax system.
Multinational firms can use the repatriated cash to increase
payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends and share
repurchases. Blouin and Krull (2009) find that firms that reported
definite plans to repatriate during the AJCA tax holiday increased share
repurchases more than did firms that did not repatriate. Dharmapala,
Foley, and Forbes (2011) also find a significant increase in share
repurchases but not in dividends during the tax holiday. The lack of
significant results for dividends might be due to the time persistence of
dividend policy and the limited length of the tax holiday. Because we
test a permanent change to earnings repatriation tax policy, we expect
the reform to also significantly affect the level of dividend payments.
We state our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation
tax costs during the worldwide tax system period distribute more cash
to shareholders by increasing both dividends and share repurchases
after the adoption of the territorial tax system.
Desai et al. (2007) find that U.S. companies with attractive
domestic investment opportunities are more likely to repatriate
earnings when the trade-off between external financing costs and
repatriation taxes favor earning repatriation. As a temporary or
permanent elimination of repatriation taxes effectively lowers the cost
of internal financing for firms with foreign earnings, it possibly creates
an incentive to invest more domestically, especially if the firms are
capital constrained. However, Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011)
show that during the 2004 AJCA tax holiday, U.S. multinational firms
used the temporary repatriation tax break to repurchase shares rather
than to invest in new domestic projects. Faulkender and Petersen
(2012), on the other hand, show that capital-constrained firms did
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invest more domestically during the tax holiday. We therefore
conjecture the following.
Hypothesis 3: Japanese and U.K. capital-constrained firms that
face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide tax system period
invest more in new domestic projects after the adoption of the
territorial tax system.
The accumulation of cash by foreign subsidiaries encouraged by
the worldwide tax system can also increase investment activity in the
subsidiary countries. Firms that might need to repatriate cash to invest
in domestic projects or other financial activities (e.g., acquisitions)
might forgo those opportunities and invest more in foreign projects.
Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi (Forthcoming) show that the lockout cash
due to the worldwide system increases acquisition activity and capital
expenditures by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms.9 As
capital-constrained firms are likely to repatriate more cash to increase
payouts or invest more domestically when repatriation taxes are
eliminated (Faulkender and Petersen 2012), their foreign subsidiaries
will see a decrease in their available cash, possibly forcing them to be
more selective about their investment opportunities. Our fourth
hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 4a: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation
tax costs during the worldwide system period invest less in new
foreign projects after the adoption of the territorial tax system.
There also exists the alternative possibility that the territorial
tax reform could create an incentive for firms to invest more abroad
due to the removal of repatriation tax costs that would eliminate a
friction in the reallocation of foreign profits to subsidiaries located in
different foreign countries. Our alternative fourth hypothesis is as
follows.
Hypothesis 4b: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation
tax costs during the worldwide tax system period invest more in new
foreign projects after the adoption of the territorial tax system.
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2. Sample and Univariate Analysis
2.1 Sample formation and variables
The initial sample consists of the entire population of Japanese
and U.K. firms covered by WorldScope from 2006 to 2011. Consistent
with previous studies, we remove financial firms and utilities. We also
remove companies for which tax data or other variables used in the
multivariate analyses are not available. Consistent with Foley et al.
(2007), our sample includes both multinational and purely domestic
firms. We categorize firms as multinational if their foreign assets are
larger than zero.10 During our sample period, the statutory corporate
tax rate in Japan is 40.7%, which is higher than any other country
with the exclusions of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait (see Table
A1). The change from the worldwide system to the territorial system
has therefore potentially reduced the tax liability of all Japanese
multinational firms repatriating earnings. The United Kingdom,
however, has a lower statutory corporate tax rate (30% during the
2006–2008 worldwide system period). U.K. firms with a majority of
foreign subsidiary profits in countries with larger corporate tax rates
enjoyed a tax credit upon the repatriation of foreign profits during the
worldwide system period, credit that they lost upon the
implementation of the territorial system in 2009. In this paper we are
interested in investigating the effect of the change in the repatriation
tax rule for firms that experienced a tax cost upon repatriation of
foreign profits during the worldwide system period (all Japanese firms
and a majority of U.K. firms); therefore, in our main tests we remove
from our sample 258 firm-year observations of U.K. firms that were
receiving a foreign repatriation tax credit during the worldwide system
period.11 Our final sample consists of 8,415 firm-year observations
(5,338 Japanese and 3,077 U.K.) and 1,976 unique firms.
The main independent variable of this study is the Income
Repatriation Tax Advantage. Similar to Foley et al. (2007), for the
period between 2006 and 2008, we compute the income repatriation
tax cost by first subtracting foreign taxes from the product of a firm's
foreign pretax income and its effective domestic tax rate.12 We then
scale this difference by total firm assets and invert the sign. For the
period between 2009 and 2011, the value taken by this variable
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depends on the domestic country of the multinational firms. For U.K.
firms, the value is set to zero. In Japan instead, to reflect the 95%
exemption rule, we estimate the tax variable from 2009 to 2011 by
multiplying the number calculated as in the 2006–2009 period by 0.05.
We also generate an Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Advantage
variable. This variable is analogous to the income repatriation tax
advantage but for substituting the firm's effective domestic tax rate
with the country (Japan of U.K.) corporate statutory tax rate as
reported in Table A1.
The control variables used in the multivariate analysis are firm
characteristics that the extant literature shows to significantly affect
cash holdings, payout policy, and corporate investments: Log of Total
Assets, Consolidated Income/Total Assets, Market-to-Book Value of
Equity, Standard Deviation of Operating Income, Leverage, Capital
Expenditures/Total Assets, R&D Expenses/Total Assets, and
Payout/Total Assets. Worldscope provides all data converted in U.S.
dollars. As stated above, our main sample includes multinational and
domestic firms. Even excluding tax considerations, multinational firms
might hold more cash, because of a longer delay between the receipt
of cash and its use, and more precautionary cash holdings, because of
greater overall risk generated by their international operations (Foley
et al. 2007). Moreover, firms with a larger proportion of income
generated abroad will proportionally pay fewer dividends if most of the
foreign income is not repatriated to the domestic headquarters. We
control for these possible differences with two income variables:
Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets. The
dependent variables of the different regression specifications are cash
holdings, corporate investments, and payout policy variables:
Cash/Net Assets, Domestic Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, Foreign
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, Dividend Payout Yield, and Net
Payout Yield. Appendix A describes all the variables used in this study.

2.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the all variables. We
provide aggregate statistics for the overall sample along with statistics
for the Japanese and U.K. subsamples. The Alternative Income
Repatriation Tax Advantage is more negative than the Income
Review of Financial Studies, Vol 28, No. 8 (August 2015): pg. 2250-2280. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Oxford University Press.

11

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Repatriation Tax Advantage because statutory tax rates are usually
higher than effective tax rates. While the median of foreign income is
zero, its average is $96.43 M, which is only slightly lower than the
average of domestic income ($101.48 M). These results suggest that
more than half of the sample firms are domestic, but multinational
firms post a large portion of their earnings abroad. This is more
pronounced for U.K. firms than for Japanese firms. The mean foreign
income of U.K. firms is higher than their mean domestic income. U.K.
firms also have larger market-to-book ratio, higher q, and higher
foreign capital expenditures than do Japanese firms. Moreover, more
than half of U.K. firms do not pay dividends or buy back shares.13 In
the main multivariate analyses, we include a country dummy, and we
also present the results of regressions estimated by separating U.K.
and Japanese firms.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics

This table presents means and medians of firm characteristics for the full
sample (which includes both multinational and domestic firms), a subsample
that includes only Japanese firms, and a subsample that includes only U.K.
firms. The sample period is from 2006–2011 unless otherwise specified in the
table. The variables are described in Appendix A.

Panel A of Table 2 presents univariate tests performed on two
subsamples generated by splitting the sample firm-year observations
between the worldwide period (2006–2008) and the territorial period
(2009–2011). The sample for these univariate tests consists only of
multinational firms. All multinational firms in our sample faced a
repatriation cost during the worldwide period (i.e., a negative
repatriation tax advantage). We present the results of t-tests of the
difference of the means and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney nonparametric
tests for the dependent variables of the multivariate analysis:
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Cash/Net Assets, Dividend Payout Yield, and Net Payout Yield (dollar
amount of dividends plus repurchases less equity issuances/total
assets), Domestic Capex/Total Assets, and Foreign Capex /Total
Assets. The tables also present the univariate test for the portion of
dividend payers. With the exclusion of Cash/Net Assets and Domestic
Capex/Assets, these univariate tests provide preliminary evidence of
changes in corporate financial policies resulting from the tax system
change. The t-tests of the mean show that multinational firms are
more likely to pay higher dividends and pay out more overall (i.e.,
dividends and repurchases) in the 2009–2011 period when the tax
cost of repatriating earnings effectively drops to zero for U.K. firms
and to a minimal amount for Japanese firms. The percentage of
dividends payers among multinational firms increases significantly
from about 72% to 89% after the switch to the territorial system. Both
the t-test of the mean and the Wilcoxon test suggest that domestic
capital expenditures have not significantly changed after the
implementation of the territorial system in 2009. Finally, both the ttest and the Wilcoxon test show that foreign capital expenditures to
total assets are significantly smaller after the tax system change.
Table 2. Univariate tests

This table presents univariate statistics for cash, payout, and capital
expenditure variables that are potentially affected by income repatriation
taxes. Panel A contrasts the means and medians of these variables during the
worldwide system period (2006–2008) and during the territorial system
period (2009–2011). For panel A, we restrict our sample to multinational
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firms. Panel B contrasts the mean and the median of the difference of each
variable between its level in 2010 (during the worldwide system period) and
2007 (during the territorial system period). The last two columns of the panel
table present the p-values of the t-test of the difference of the means and the
p-value of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney nonparametric test.

The univariate test presented in panel B of Table 2 does,
instead, compare the change in cash levels, payout levels, and capital
expenditures between 2007 (the penultimate territorial system year)
and 2010 (the second worldwide system year) for multinational and
domestic firms. This comparison is particularly useful because
domestic firms do not face income repatriation taxes and therefore are
unaffected by the income repatriation tax system change. We define
domestic firms as those firms with neither foreign assets nor foreign
income.
The domestic firm sample used for this comparison is formed by
domestic firms matched to their corresponding multinational firms in
2007 by total assets, market-to-book, and industry. We select
matching domestic firms that have the same industry classification of
the sample firms and are similar in size (total assets) and market-tobook ratio in 2007, our first sample year. In the first step of our
matching procedure, we identify firms (1) with the same two-digit SIC
code of the sample firms, (2) with a level of total assets between 80%
and 120% of the sample firm's level, and (3) with a market-to-book
ratio between 80% and 120% of the sample firm's ratio. If more than
one firm meets the matching criteria for a single sample firm, we
choose the one that minimizes the following formula:

|𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 | + |𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 |, (1)

where TAmult and TAdom are the total assets for the multinational and
domestic firms and MBmult and MBdom are their market-to-book ratios.
If we do not find any firm that meets these criteria, we repeat the
process looking at firms with the same one-digit SIC code. If this
search is unsuccessful, we match the firm independently from the SIC
code. If we still do not find a valid match, we select the firm that
minimizes formula (1) independently from the industry.
With the exclusion of Domestic Capex/Assets, these univariate
tests show that our variables of interest change significantly more for
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multinational firms. Consistent with our hypotheses, the t-tests of the
mean and the Wilcoxon parametric tests show that multinational firms
experience a slight decrease in the mean and a slight increase in the
median cash levels between 2007 and 2010, whereas domestic firms'
cash levels increased significantly more. Moreover, multinational firms
increased dividend and total payouts significantly more than did
domestic firms between 2007 and 2010. Overall, the results presented
in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that, after the adoption of the
territorial tax system of income repatriation, multinational firms are
more likely to transfer income to their domestic headquarters to pay
more dividends, buy back shares, and invest domestically rather than
abroad. On aggregate, the annual amount paid in dividends by
Japanese and U.K. multinational firms in our sample went from an
average of $93 billion in the three years preceding the reform to $108
billion after the reform. Net repurchases increased less drastically from
$32 to $36 billion. Domestic capital expenditures went from $25 to
$19 billion, while foreign capital expenditures dropped from $51 to $22
billion.14
Figure 1 provides a complementary visual representation of the
univariate results of Table 2 by illustrating the difference in annual
median values for the variables of interest between multinational and
domestic firms.15 While domestic firms hold larger quantities of
cash/assets than multinational firms across the entire sample period,
the difference becomes larger during the territorial system period.
Multinational firms have lower dividend yields than did domestic firms
during the worldwide system period (2006–2008) but had higher
yields during the territorial system period (2009–2011). The net
payout yield graph presents a similar picture. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis of multinational firms increasing
dividend payments during the territorial system period. As also
reported earlier, earnings (and as a consequence market value) of
Japanese and U.K. domestic firms was affected by the financial crisis in
2007 and the beginning of the recession in 2008 more than were
earnings of multinational firms. The difference is likely due to the fact
that their larger size and, for many of them, operations in developing
countries less affected by the recession allowed multinational firms to
reduce the negative effect of the recession. This difference can explain
the larger decline in the difference in payout yields between
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multinational and domestic firms in 2007 and 2008 in a univariate
setting.
Figure 1.

Change in firm characteristics around the reform
Difference in the annual median cash/assets, dividend yield, net
payout yield, and domestic capital expenditures/assets between
multinational and domestic firms. For foreign capital
expenditures/assets, the figure presents the annual median values for
multinational firms.
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The foreign capital expenditures/assets graph shows a marked
decline in foreign investments following the tax system reform.
Conversely, a comparison between the median domestic capital
expenditures/assets of multinational and foreign firms does not
provide evidence of a defined trend around the territorial tax reform.
The increase in the difference in domestic investments in 2011 is
mainly driven by a decline in domestic investments by domestic firms
in that year. The reason for this decline is not due to the change in
repatriation tax (the reform did not affect domestic firms) and would
require an empirical investigation outside of the scope of this paper.
Relevant to our study is the negligible change in the difference
between 2008 and 2009. In the multivariate analysis, we control for
several firm characteristics and industry, year, or firm effects to
control for a multitude on nontax determinants of payouts and
investments that can drive some of the changes evidenced by the
graph before and after the tax reform.

3. Main Multivariate Analysis
Our multivariate analysis consists of several regression
specifications that examine the effect of the change from the
repatriation worldwide system to the territorial system on the
decisions by Japanese and U.K. firms about (1) the level of cash
holdings, (2) payout policy (both dividend payments and share
repurchases), and (3) the amount of corporate investments abroad
and in their domestic country. All regressions specifications are fixed
effects regressions:

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (2)

where yit is one of the corporate financial policy-dependent variables
listed above, Xit is a vector of the time-varying tax and firm-level
characteristics listed in the variable section, αc is a country dummy, λj
are industry fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects, and ϵit is the error
term.
The data vary along three dimensions: time, industry, and
country. The inclusion of two different countries allows us to
investigate how the tax reform affects financial policies, while
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controlling for the country variation that is industry and firm specific in
a way that is not possible in the typical single-country studies. When
estimating Equation (2), we account for serial correlation by
estimating clustered (Rogers) standard errors, which are White
standard errors that account for within-firm correlation. We also
estimate regression specifications with firm fixed effects in place of
industry and country effects. Firm effects have the advantage of more
cleanly identifying within-firms changes due to the reform. This
advantage is, however, partially offset by the loss of many degrees of
freedom that, in conjunction with the limited sample period, reduces
the power of our tests.16

3.1 Repatriation tax costs and cash
Table 3 presents the results of fixed effects linear regressions
with the natural logarithm of cash to net assets as the dependent
variable. The first three columns present the results for regressions
estimated on the full sample. In the first and third specification, we
use Income Repatriation Tax Advantage as the tax variable of interest,
and in the second specification, we use the AlternativeIncome
Repatriation Tax Advantage variable. The first two specifications
include industry and year fixed effects, and the third and fourth
specifications include firm fixed effects. In the last two columns, we
present the results of regressions estimated separately for Japanese
and U.K. firms.
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Table 3. Cash holdings and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with the
logarithm of cash divided by net assets as the dependent variable. The first
four columns present the results for regressions, including all observations.
The fifth column present results for Japanese firms, whereas the sixth column
presents results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values,
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are
presented in parentheses.

All these specifications present a consistent picture. Both
repatriation tax advantage variable coefficients are negative and
significant. After 2008, when firms were exempted from taxes upon
repatriation of income from lower tax rate countries because of the
switch to a territorial tax system, U.K. and Japanese firms significantly
accumulated less cash. This result is consistent with our first
hypothesis and confirms the result obtained by Foley et al. (2007) for
U.S. corporations. This result also has economic significance. If the
Income Repatriation Tax Advantage in the first specification goes from
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its 2006–2008 mean value of −0.0030 to effectively zero during the
2009–2011, cash holdings for a multinational firms with average
assets drop $64 M, according to the industry fixed effect specification,
and $43 M, according to the firm fixed effect specification, everything
else constant.
Consistent with previous studies about cash holdings
determinants (e.g., et al. 1999), larger companies and companies with
more debt, more capital expenditures, fewer R&D expenses, and larger
payouts (dividends and share repurchases) hold significantly less cash.
The positive and significant coefficient of SD of operating income
suggests that the firms in our sample accumulate more cash when
faced with more uncertainty, consistent with what Arena and Julio
(2014) show for U.S. corporations.

3.2 Repatriation tax cost and corporate payouts
Cash repatriated to the domestic headquarters might be used by
corporations to increase corporate payouts. In Table 4 we analyze the
effect of income repatriation tax costs on dividends; in Table 5 we
analyze the effect of the tax reform on the net share repurchase yield
(share repurchase amount minus new share issuance amount dividend
by market capitalization); and in Table 6 we report the effect of
income repatriation tax costs on total payouts (dividends and net
share repurchases). Because of a mass of observations at zero, due to
numerous firms in the sample that do not pay dividends or repurchase
shares, we estimate Tobit regressions. Standard firm effects Tobit
regressions, due to the multitude of firm fixed effects, do not provide
consistent results because fixed effects cannot be conditioned out of
the likelihood. Therefore, for the firm fixed effects specifications, we
use Honoré (1992) semiparametric estimator for fixed effect Tobit
models known as trimmed least absolute deviation (LAD). The LAD
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal in firm effects
specifications.
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Table 4. Dividend payout yield and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the
dividend payout yield as the dependent variable. The firm fixed effects
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's (1992) trimmed
least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The dividend payout yield is the
firm's annual dividend payments divided by its year-end market value. The
first four columns present the results for regressions including all
observations. The fifth column present results for Japanese firms, while the
sixth column presents results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in
Appendix A. The regressions include year, country and industry or firm fixed
effects. p-values, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of
errors by firm, are presented in parentheses.
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Table 5. Net repurchase payout yield and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the
net repurchase payout yield as the dependent variable. The firm fixed effects
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's (1992) trimmed
least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The net repurchase payout yield is
the firm's annual share repurchase amount minus the share issuance amount
divided by its year-end market value. The first four columns present the
results for regressions including all observations. The fifth column present
results for Japanese firms, while the sixth column presents results for U.K.
firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The regressions include year,
country and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values, obtained with standard
errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are presented in parentheses.
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Table 6. Net payout yield and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the
total payout yield as the dependent variable. The firm fixed effects
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's (1992) trimmed
least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The net payout yield is the firm's
annual dividend payments plus net share repurchase amount minus equity
issuance, all divided by its year-end market value. The first four columns
present the results for regressions, including all observations. The fifth
column present results for Japanese firms, and the sixth column presents
results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values,
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are
presented in parentheses.

The results presented in Table 4 show that both proxies for the
repatriation tax advantage are positive and significantly related to the
dividend payout yield. The results are also robust to the inclusion of
firm fixed effects. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the
exemption from repatriation taxes due to the enactment of the
territorial system had the significant effect of increasing dividend
payments by U.K. and Japanese corporations. The coefficient of the
Income Repatriation Tax Advantage implies a large change in dividend
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yield after the implementation of the territorial system. If the Income
Repatriation Tax Advantage in the industry fixed effect specification
(1) (firm fixed effect specification 3) goes from its 2006–2008 mean
value of −0.0030 to effectively zero during the 2009–2011, the
dividend yield increases from 1.67% to 1.93% (from 1.69% to
1.91%), everything else constant, at the median. This change in yield
corresponds to an increase of $60 M ($51 M) in dividends for a
multinational firm with average assets and market-to-book ratio in our
sample. These results are remarkable considering that both in the
United Kingdom and in Japan the stock market experienced a
significant decline in value between 2006 and 2008, followed by a gain
between 2009 and 2011.17 The slightly lower significance of the
Income Repatriation Tax Advantage variable coefficient in the U.K.only regression can be explained by a larger relative increase in stock
market returns in the United Kingdom, compared with Japan, between
2009 and 2006 and by a smaller number of dividend-paying firms in
any given year in the United Kingdom than in Japan.
The results of Table 4 differ from what Dharmapala, Foley, and
Forbes (2011) find for dividend payments. Because of the significant
lasting consequences that changes in dividend payments have on firm
value, firms smooth dividends, while exploiting the flexibility of share
repurchases for fast adjustment in payouts (Skinner (2008)). The
results of Table 4 show that a permanent exogenous change in the tax
system has a significant effect on the less flexible dividend policy.
The control variables have coefficients consistent with the
findings of previous studies that analyze the determinants of payout
policy (Grullon et al. (2011); Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)). Larger
companies, more profitable companies, and companies with lower
leverage, lower R&D expenses, and less income volatility distribute
more cash to their shareholders in the form of dividends.
The results of the net repurchase yield regressions in Table 5
provide useful complementary information to the results of Table 4.
For the regressions estimated with the full sample, the Tax Advantage
coefficients are positive and significant. This result is consistent with
the hypothesis that the territorial tax reform has increased the level of
share repurchases as a consequence of reducing the cost of
repatriating profits to the firm's domestic headquarters. However, the
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statistical significance of the Tax Advantage coefficients is lower than
in the dividend regressions. A comparison of the results of Tables 4
and 5 suggests that the permanent change in the tax code had a more
significant effect on dividend policy. The results for the U.K. sample
regression show that the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage
coefficient is not significant. It is likely that the tax reform did not
significantly affect share repurchase levels in the United Kingdom due
to other strict regulations that strongly limit the efficacy of share
repurchase programs for British firms. Rau and Vermaelen (2002)
show that, due to several reasons, share repurchase activity by U.K.
firms is minimal compared with U.S. firms. The Model Code prevents
U.K. firms from repurchasing shares in the two-month period prior to
the filing of annual earnings and semiannual earnings and in the one
month before the release of quarterly results. Moreover, U.K. firms are
required to cancel all repurchased shares. This rule drastically reduces
the flexibility of share repurchases in the United Kingdom because it
prevents the creation of treasury stock (i.e., shares that are
repurchased but can be reissued without shareholder approval).18
The results of the net payout yield regressions presented in
Table 6 are consistent with the results of the dividend and share
repurchase regressions. The exemption from income repatriation taxes
also has a positive and significant effect of total net payouts. A change
of the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage in the industry fixed effect
specification (1) (firm fixed effect specification 3) from its 2006–2008
mean value of −0.0030 to zero during the 2009–2011 territorial
system period causes a 16% (15%) increase in net payout yield from
1.84% to 2.14% (1.84% to 2.11%), everything else constant. This
change in yield corresponds to an increase of $69 M ($64 M) in net
payouts for a multinational firm with average assets and market-tobook ratio in our sample. The coefficients of control variables have the
expected sign consistent with the dividend and repurchase regressions
results of Tables 4 and 5 and previous studies on payout policy. For a
multinational firm with average assets, the results of the firm fixed
effect regression suggest that $51 M out of the $64 M increase in
payouts comes from an increase in dividends. This result provides
evidence of the stronger effect that the permanent tax reform had on
dividends than on repurchases.
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3.3 Repatriation tax cost and corporate investments
The payout results presented in the previous tables show that
firms use at least a portion of the cash repatriated to the domestic
country to increase distributions to shareholders in the form of
dividends and share repurchases. Some of the repatriated cash also
could be possibly used to increase domestic investments. We test this
hypothesis by estimating fixed effects regressions with domestic
capital expenditures over assets as the dependent variables. 19Table 7
presents the results. Neither repatriation tax proxy in any of the
specifications has a significant coefficient, suggesting that after the
implementation of the territorial system U.K. and Japanese firms do
not use the additional cash repatriated to their domestic country to
increase domestic investments. The third specification of Table 7
includes an interaction variable between the tax advantage variable
and a measure of capital constraint similar to the one used by
Faulkender and Petersen (2012). Capital Constrained is defined as the
percentage of the previous four years in which operating cash flows
(operating income after tax) were lower than capital expenditures.
Capital-constrained firms are possibly more likely to increase domestic
investment instead of increasing payouts when allowed to repatriate
earnings at no additional tax cost. However, our results are not
consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction
variable between the tax advantage (alternative tax advantage)
variable and the capital-constrained variable is not statistically
significant. The coefficients of the control variables show that smaller
firms and firms with greater domestic profits, with the exclusion of the
U.K.-only sample, invest proportionally more in their domestic country.
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Table 7. Domestic investments and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with domestic
capital expenditures to total assets as the dependent variable. The first five
columns present the results for regressions, including all observations. The
sixth column present results for Japanese firms, and the seventh column
presents results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values,
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are
presented in parentheses.

Another possible consequence of repatriating more profits after
the enactment of the territorial system is a lower likelihood to invest in
less valuable projects in foreign countries and an overall improvement
in the allocation of funds across countries. Alternatively, the territorial
reform might encourage foreign investments due to the removal of the
repatriation tax that could encourage firms to increase foreign profits
due to the added ability to employ these profits for domestic uses at
no additional tax penalty. We investigate these two alternative
hypotheses by estimating fixed effects Tobit regressions with foreign
capital expenditures divided by total assets as the dependent variable.
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As for the payout regressions, we use the Honoré's (1992) LAD
estimator for the firm fixed effects specifications. Table 8 presents the
results.
Table 8. Foreign investments and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with
foreign capital expenditures to total assets as the dependent variable. The
firm fixed effects specifications (3) and (4) are estimated with the Honoré's
(1992) trimmed least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. The first four
columns present the results for regressions including all observations. The
fifth column present results for Japanese firms, and the sixth column presents
results for U.K. firms. All variables are described in Appendix A. The
regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. p-values,
obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are
presented in parentheses.

Both repatriation tax advantage proxies in all specifications have
negative and significant coefficients consistent with our hypothesis
that the exemption from repatriation taxes due to the implementation
of the territorial system has significantly reduced foreign investments.
The Income Repatriation Tax Advantage also has strong economic
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significance. A change of the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage
coefficient from its 2006–2008 mean value of −0.0030 to zero during
the 2009–2011 territorial system period causes a 9.2% decrease in
foreign capex/assets in the industry fixed effects specification and a
7.1% decrease in the firm fixed effects specification, which
corresponds to a decline of $17.5 M and $13.5 M for a multinational
firm with average assets depending on the specification, everything
else constant, at the median.
Overall, the results of the industry (firm) fixed effects
regressions with the Income Repatriation Tax Advantage as tax
variable suggest that for a multinational firm with average assets in
our sample after the territorial system reform cash holdings decline by
$64 M ($43 M), and foreign investments decline by about $18 M ($14
M). Net payouts, on the other hand, increase by $69 M ($64 M), of
which between $60 M ($51 M) are due to an increase in dividends.
All in all, the tests discussed in this section show that the switch
from a worldwide repatriation system to a territorial system had the
effect of encouraging multinational firms to save more foreign cash by
cutting foreign investments and to transfer larger quantities of foreign
cash to their domestic country to increase corporate payouts, but not
domestic investments. While firms can quickly implement changes in
their payout policy, they might need a longer time to plan and bring to
fruition capital investments in the domestic country after a tax law
change. Another possible reason why our results do not show a rapid
increase in domestic investments following the tax reform is that,
contrary to the U.S. temporary tax holiday, Japanese and U.K. firms
were not required to commit to new domestic investments to
repatriate earnings without incurring in repatriation taxes.

4. Robustness tests
Because during our sample period the United Kingdom has a
relatively high statutory corporate tax rate (30%–26%), but one that
is lower than some other countries (see Table A1), a group of U.K.
firms with a majority of foreign operations in countries with higher tax
rates benefitted from a tax credit upon repatriation of foreign earnings
during the worldwide system period.20 This group of firms are likely to
respond to the territorial tax reform in the opposite way than would
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firms facing a tax liability upon repatriation during the worldwide
period. The territorial tax system reform essentially removed the
repatriation tax credit enjoyed by these firms and therefore eliminated
an incentive to repatriate profits for domestic uses of cash, such as
dividends, share repurchases, and domestic investments. This group of
firms, therefore, allows us to estimate a test in which we can compare
the behavior of firms facing a tax cost with firms benefitting from a tax
credit upon repatriating earnings during the worldwide system period
and how these two groups reacted to the territorial reform. For this
test, we limit our sample to multinational firms headquartered in the
United Kingdom. We categorize firms as “Repatriation Tax Credit
Firms” if the variable Income Repatriation Tax Advantage assumes a
positive value for at least two of the three years of the worldwide
system period. To verify if these tax credit firms behave in a different
way than would firms facing a repatriation tax cost before and after
the reform, we estimate regressions with the Repatriation Tax Credit
Firm indicator along with the interaction variable Repatriation Tax
Credit Firm x Territorial Period, which assumes the value of one for
repatriation tax credit firm during the 2009–2011 territorial period.
Table 9 presents the results of these regressions. In the
regression with cash/assets as the dependent variable, the coefficients
of the two tax credit indicator variables show that firms enjoying a
repatriation tax credit during the worldwide period hold significantly
less cash than do firms facing a repatriation cost, but then they
increase their cash holdings as they lose the tax credit during the
territorial period. The dividend yield and payout yield regressions show
that tax credit firms pay higher dividends during the worldwide period
and reduce dividends during the territorial period. It is worth noting
that the magnitude of the coefficients of the two indicators in the cash,
dividend, and payout regressions have similar size with inverted signs
suggesting that during the territorial period, after controlling for all
factors affecting cash and payout policy, there is little difference in
cash and payout policy between firms facing a cost or enjoying a credit
during the worldwide system. This result is due to the reform
effectively eliminating a tax disparity between these two types of
firms. Consistent with the results of the main multivariate regressions,
the coefficients of the tax variables are not significant in the domestic
investment regressions. The Repatriation Tax Credit Firm coefficient in
the foreign investment regression is negative and significant,
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suggesting that repatriation tax credit firms invest less abroad during
the worldwide period. Even though the Repatriation Tax Credit Firm x
Territorial Period coefficient is not significant, the coefficients of the
two indicators taken together (=−0.0115+0.0098=−0.0017) suggest
that the reform has essentially eliminated the effect that the worldwide
system had on foreign investments.
Table 9. U.K. tax credit firms

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with
ln(cash/assets), dividend yield, net repurchase yield, net payout yield,
domestic capital expenditures/assets, and foreign capital expenditures/assets
as the dependent variables. The sample consists only of U.K. multinational
firms. The main explanatory variables are (1) an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm received tax credit upon repatriation during the worldwide
system period and (2) an interaction variable between the repatriation tax
credit firm dummy and an indicator variable equal to one for the 2009–2011
territorial system period. All variables are described in Appendix A. The
regressions include firm fixed effects. p-values, obtained with standard errors
corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are presented in parentheses.
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As for most countries around the world, both Japan and the
United Kingdom experienced a deep recession in 2008 and 2009. As a
robustness test to control for business cyclicality and the effects of the
recession, we replicate our multivariate tests, excluding the
recessionary years' observations. All the tax variable coefficients
maintain the same sign and are statistically significant (with the
exception of those for the domestic investments regressions). The
significance is sometimes at a lower level because of the smaller
sample size, which reduces the power of our tests.
In the main regressions discussed in the previous section, we
control for year and industry effects in most specifications. However,
there could be specific temporal trends by industry that might affect
some of our results. To control for this possibility, we re-estimate our
multivariate tests, including industry x year fixed effects in unreported
specifications. The coefficients of the Income Repatriation Tax
Advantage maintain their significance. Overall, this test show that our
results are robust to the inclusion of annual industry effects.21
In our multivariate analysis, consistent with the payout
literature (e.g., Hoberg and Prabhala (2009); Grullon et al. (2011))
and corporate practices, we measure payout activity with yield
variables by dividing dividends, share repurchases, and total net
payout by firms' market value. However, the market value of many
companies experienced large fluctuations during our sample period
due to the recessionary years. To test the robustness of our payout
results to changes in market value we re-estimate our payout
regressions by substituting the yield dependent variables with payouts
divided by total assets. Table 10 presents the results. The significance
of the tax advantage variables for the different specifications is
comparable with that obtained from the payout yield regressions
presented in the main multivariate section.
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Table 10. Payouts to assets and income repatriation tax cost

This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with
dividends to assets, net share repurchases to assets, and net total payouts to
assets as the dependent variables. All variables are described in Appendix A.
The regressions include year, country, and industry or firm fixed effects. pvalues, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by
firm, are presented in parentheses.

5. Conclusions
Countries rarely make clear-cut changes to their taxation rules.
In this study we exploit one of those rare opportunities offered by the
decision of Japan and the United Kingdom in 2009 to switch from a
worldwide to a territorial system for the taxation of repatriated foreign
corporate income. We find that this change had broad and significant
repercussions on corporate financial decisions.
The switch from a tax credit repatriation system to a territorial
system in Japan and the United Kingdom offered multinational firms
residing in these two countries the ability to repatriate foreign income
at no additional or significantly lower tax costs. Overall, the results of
this study suggest that the removal of this tax disadvantage when
repatriating earnings had the effect of encouraging multinational firms
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to save more cash abroad by cutting foreign investments and to
transfer larger quantities of foreign cash to the domestic country to
increase corporate payouts rather than domestic investments. The
ability to use more cash from the firms' headquarters location for
payouts had the additional effect of decreasing consolidated cash
holdings. The results of this paper may assist the decision-making
process of policy makers in the United States and other countries that
are currently adopting a worldwide system and are considering a
change in their tax repatriation rule. In more general terms, this study
underlines how a permanent change in the corporate tax code can
have strong, long-standing consequences for corporate financial
policies that ultimately affect shareholder wealth and the level of
employment in domestic and foreign countries.
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Appendix
Table A1. Country corporate tax rate
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Local corporate tax rate are averaged at the country level and added to the
statutory country tax rate. Countries are ordered by descending 2006 tax
rate. Source: KPMG.

Appendix A
Variable definitions
Variable
Alternative Income
Repatriation Tax
Advantage

Definition
The product of a firm's foreign pretax income and its
country corporate tax rate minus foreign taxes paid.
The maximum of this difference or zero is then
divided by total firm assets and the sign is inverted.
This variable is set to zero between 2009 and 2011

Log (Cash/Net Assets) Natural logarithm of cash plus marketable securities
divided by total assets minus cash and marketable
securities
Capital Constrained

Percentage of the four previous years during which
the firm had operating cash flows (operating profits
minus taxes) below capital expenditures

Capital
Expenditures/Total
Assets

Total capital expenditures divided by total assets

Dividend Payout Yield

Firm's annual dividend payments divided by its yearend market value
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Variable
Domestic Capex/Total
Assets

Definition
Domestic capital expenditures divided by total
assets

Domestic Income/Total Domestic earnings before interest and taxes divided
Assets
by total assets
Foreign Capex/Total
Assets

Foreign capital expenditures divided by total assets

Foreign Income/Total
Assets

Foreign earnings before interest and taxes divided by
total assets.

Income Repatriation
Tax Advantage

The product of a firm's foreign pre-tax income and
its effective tax rate minus foreign taxes paid. The
maximum of this difference or zero is then divided
by total firm assets and the sign is inverted. . This
variable is set to zero between 2009 and 2011

Leverage

(Long-term debt + short-term debt)/total assets

Log of Total Assets

Natural logarithm of the firm assets

Net Payout Yield

firm's annual total net payout (dividends plus
repurchases less equity issuances) divided by its
year-end market value

R&D Expenses/Total
Assets

Research and Development expenses, set to zero if
missing, divided by total assets

Market-to-Book Value
of Equity

Ratio of the market value to the book value of a
firm's equity

St. Dev. of Operating
Income

Standard deviation of the firm's annual operating
income during the sample period

Tobin's Q

Total assets plus market value of equity minus book
value of equity, all divided by total assets

Total Income/Total
Consolidated earnings before interest and taxes
Assets
divided by total assets
All the financial statement data used to construct the variables are retrieved
from Worldscope and expressed in U.S. dollars.
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Source: Thomson Reuters Worldscope.
8
As stated by the 2013 IMF Fiscal Monitor Report Survey, these tax
avoidance techniques are implemented by multinational firms in both
advanced and developing economies. However, the problem is less
acute in Japan because Tax Heaven Counter Measure Laws effectively
limit tax avoidance schemes via tax heavens.
9
Let us consider a Japanese multinational firm with a cost of capital of
11%. This firm needs to repatriate cash to invest in a project that will
generate $150 M in cash flows next year and will require an
investment of $100 M this year (the NPV is therefore $35.1 M). The
cash could be repatriated from a Dutch subsidiary. The Dutch
subsidiary also has an investment opportunity that could generate
$135 M next year and requires a $100 M investment this year (the
NPV is $21.6 M). In the absence of repatriation taxes, the cash would
be repatriated to invest in the more lucrative domestic project. Under
the worldwide tax system, the foreign project would be chosen
instead. The statutory corporate tax in the Netherlands is 25.5%,
whereas it is 40.69% in Japan. The 15.19% difference on the $100 M
would be paid upon repatriation. Therefore, approximately $118 M
would need to be repatriated to have $100 M after tax to invest in the
domestic project (118*(1-0.1519) = 100). Effectively, therefore, the
domestic project requires an investment of $118 M, reducing the NPV
to $17.1 M, which is lower than the NPV of the foreign project.
Hartman (1985) argues that under the worldwide system if the aftertax rate of return abroad is higher (lower) than the domestic net rate
of return, the firm would invest abroad and repatriate in the following
period (repatriate immediately and invest domestically). However, if
there is an expectation of a tax holiday or a territorial tax system
reform in one of the following periods, the firm is more likely to
reinvest in foreign projects even when their returns are lower,
consistent with our hypothesis and numerical example.
10
Worldscope provides data about foreign assets, foreign capital
expenditures, foreign income, and foreign income taxes for firms with
foreign operations.
11
We include these tax-credit firms in one of our robustness tests.
12
We calculate the effective domestic tax rate by dividing domestic
income taxes by pretax domestic income. Foreign taxes include also
6
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any possible withholding taxes on dividends (earnings transferred to
the domestic country) levied by the subsidiary country.
13
The proportion of U.K. dividend payer to nonpayer in our sample is
49:51.
14
We report these aggregate figures purely for illustrative purposes.
The reported numbers are affected by any change in the number of
multinational firms over the years and, most of all, changes in firm
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions during and after the
recession.
15
The only exception is the graph of foreign capital expenditures,
which just reports the multinational firms' annual median values.
16
In unreported results, we also repeat all of our tests using a
difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approach, in which we
compare changes in financial policy variables for a treated group of
companies that are affected by the tax law change (i.e., multinational
firms) with a control group of companies that are not affected by the
tax change (i.e., purely domestic firms). The results are qualitatively
identical.
17
We check for the robustness of our results by scaling payouts by
assets rather than by market values in regressions that are presented
in Table 10.
18
Refer to Rau and Vermaelen (2002) for a detailed discussion of U.K.
regulations on share repurchases.
19
For the domestic firms in our sample, domestic capital expenditures
coincide with consolidated capital expenditures.
20
When we include those firms in our sample, the results do not
significantly change. These results are available upon request.
21
The results of these tests are available upon request.
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